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We asses the extent to which ﬁscal policy, as automatic stabilisers, can sta-
bilise national economies within EMU. We use a two-country New Keynesian
DGE model with liquidity constrained consumers, sticky prices, and a home
bias in the composition of national consumption bundles. The model allows
a variety of channels for ﬁscal policy, and is estimated using Euro area data.
We analyse the the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policies in EMU and
demonstrate that, perhaps surprisingly, macroeconomic adjustment is not al-
ways facilitated by ﬁscal stabilisers in the case of certain types of shocks. The
stabilising eﬀects of ﬁscal policy at the national level are strictly dependent
on the existence of home bias in consumption.
JEL Codes: E58, E62, E631 Introduction
There is a general consensus that national ﬁscal policies should play an en-
hanced role in adjusting to macroeconomic shocks within EMU. The absence
of national monetary policies, and the potentially destabilising impact of in-
ﬂation diﬀerentials on real interest diﬀerentials only leave ﬁscal policy as a
tool to oﬀset asymmetric shocks.
Some economists have gone as far as advocating a greater emphasis on
ﬁscal policy as a key policy instrument in macroeconomic adjustment (see
Ball, 1997, Wren-Lewis, 2000, 2002). In the context of EMU, this has also
led to calls to radically reform the Stability and Growth pact and render
ﬁscal policy-making more transparent. Calmfors (2003) argues for a more
transparent institutional framework for national (discretionary) ﬁscal poli-
cies within EMU, with clear objectives and a solution based on national
ﬁscal committees. Other economists have challenged this perspective and
see automatic stabilisers, within the constraints of a reformed SGP, as the
key to macroeconomic adjustment within EMU (Buti et al., 1997, 2001, Eu-
ropean Commission, 2001). This ’Brussels consensus’ is based on the view
that the ECB alone should stabilize the union-wide economy (Buti et al.,
2001). The key question which we ask of this model is whether ﬁscal policy,
through automatic stabilisers (modeled as feedback rules on output) in each
country adds value to the stabilization role played by monetary policy in the
Euro area.
In this this paper we examine the validity of this proposition and as-
sess the performance of ﬁscal stabilisers within EMU. We do this using a
small two-country model of EMU, estimated using the synthetic Euro-data
collected over the period 1970-1998. While the structural model used in
this paper has many elements in common with other New Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, our analysis diﬀers
in a number of respects. First, our model includes a wider range of ﬁscal
policy transmission channels than similar New Keynesian models, including
"non-Ricardian" eﬀects on consumption due to rule-of-thumb (RT hence-
forth) consumers (as in Galì et al. 2002, Amato and Laubach, 2003, and
Muscatelli et al. 2003b) and supply-side distortions. Second, our model is
estimated, in contrast to some attempts to calibrate or numerically simu-
late these models (see Andres and Domenech, 2003). Third, our two-country
model features a home bias in consumption which, as we shall demonstrate,
impacts on how automatic ﬁscal stabilisers interact with monetary policy in
1a monetary union.
Earlier contributions (Andres and Domenech, 2003; Gordon and Leeper,
2003; Muscatelli et al., 2003a) found that countercyclical ﬁscal policy can
be welfare-reducing in the presence of optimizing consumers. Muscatelli et
al. (2003b) estimate the proportion of RT consumers in the US and show
that automatic stabilizers based on taxation improve the performance of the
economy. Here we ﬁnd that the proportion of RT consumers is far larger in
the Euro area, possibly due to ﬁnancial market imperfections. This result
is in line with a relatively large body of empirical evidence. Asdrubali and
Kim (2004) ﬁnd that, following an output shock, EU capital markets enable a
very limited degree of consumption smoothing relative to the US. Fair (2001)
ﬁnds that, unlike the US, in most EU countries there is little evidence of real
interest rate eﬀects on aggregate consumption. As we see below, this is easily
reconciled with our result about the large share of RT consumers who do
not directly react to interest rate shocks. Finally, our estimate is consistent
with the cross country evidence about the share of current income consumers
presented in Sarantis and Stewart (2003).
We use our estimates to simulate a two-country version of the model
with a single central bank and independent ﬁscal authorities. We ﬁnd that
the stabilising eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in response to EMU-wide shocks carry
over to the case of asymmetric disturbances only if a signiﬁcant home bias
characterises national consumption bundles. Thus our results suggest a novel
approach to the philosophy of EMU macroeconomic policymaking. At the
Euro area level, the action of automatic stabilisers should be regarded as a
useful complement to the ECB actions. On the other hand the usual case for
ﬁscal stabilisation of within-EMU asymmetric shocks is conﬁrmed only if the
composition of national aggregate demand functions are suﬃciently biased
towards domestic production. This is in sharp contrast with the "Brussels
consensus" based on the view that the ECB alone should stabilize the union-
wide economy (Buti et al., 2001)
In the next section we outline our model and the empirical methodology.
In Section 3, we report our econometric results and illustrate the properties
of the model by looking at its impulse responses. In section 4 we consider
the value added of having national ﬁscal stabilisers in EMU using out two
country monetary union model. Section 5 concludes.
22 A Two-country New Keynesian Model with
Home-Biased Consumer Preferences
2.1 General Approach
Early vintages of New Keynesian DSGE models involved a limited role for
ﬁscal policy, by assuming lump-sum and representative agents with inﬁnite
planning horizon. Another strand of literature has modelled more complex
supply-side eﬀects for ﬁscal stabilization policies by allowing taxation distor-
tions (see Andres and Domenech, 2003 and the references therein).
Studies of the business cycle using VAR-type models do not provide em-
pirical support for this simple description of demand-side eﬀects in the New
Keynesian model. Giavazzi et al. (2000) show that both Keynesian and neo-
classical (Ricardian) eﬀects are present. Fatas and Mihov (2001), Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and Muscatelli et al. (2004) show that ﬁscal shocks have
conventional Keynesian eﬀects, in that an increase in government spending
causes a persistent rise in output1 and consumption. Galí et al. (2002)
demonstrate that this problem can be addressed by adding non-optimising
behavior to the conventional New Keynesian model. They assume that a pro-
portion of consumers are constrained to consume out of current income and
show that, under plausible parameterizations, this provides an explanation
for the positive response of consumption to a temporary government spend-
ing shock. The increase in government spending generates an increase in the
real wage (providing the substitution eﬀect between consumption and leisure
dominates the wealth eﬀect), and causes an increase in aggregate consump-
tion because ’RT’ consumers spend out of current income.2 Introducing non-
optimising consumers also potentially allows for other transmission channels
for ﬁscal policy. Even if taxes are lump sum, they will impact on aggregate
consumption behaviour through their eﬀect on the current nominal income
of RT consumers. Furthermore, payroll taxes aﬀect marginal costs and in-
ﬂation. This, in turn, has an obvious impact on aggregate consumption if
wages are sticky.
There are other ways, however, to model non-ricardian consumers. Debt-
1The implied ﬁscal multiplier is close to or greater than unity.
2Whether consumption actually increases in such models depends crucially on the as-
sumptions made about labour supply and price-stickiness, given the linkage between con-
sumption and leisure (and hence the real wage) via the consumer’s optimization problem.
3ﬁnanced ﬁscal deﬁcits will have an impact on aggregate demand in versions
of the New Keynesian model which depart from Ricardian equivalence be-
cause of the presence of ﬁnite horizons, as in the classic Blanchard-Yaari
model (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000). Other eﬀects of government debt on
consumer behavior can also be considered, such as the impact that ﬁnancial
wealth has on household transactions costs, which can explain the observed
positive correlation between public expenditure shocks and consumption (see
Schabert, 2004).
Unfortunately there is a trade-oﬀ in estimating New Keynesian models
which contain all these channels ﬁscal policy transmission and maintaining
the model suﬃciently parsimonious in terms of structural parameters to allow
classical econometric techniques to be employed. A complex model will typi-
cally be underidentiﬁed with respect to the structural parameters of interest
or will result in poorly-deﬁned (in a statistical sense) estimated parameters.
In modelling the transmission of ﬁscal policies, we have therefore chosen to
restrict the demand side to the inclusion of non-optimising (RT) consumers.
On the supply side, we allow for taxation eﬀects on ﬁrms’ marginal costs
(through payroll taxes). This, in contrast with early attempts to estimate
structural New Keynesian models3, allows for a richer range of transmission
channels for ﬁscal policy, whilst still maintaining a model where the struc-
tural parameters are estimated using econometric methods.
2.2 The Model
The global economy (monetary union) consists of two countries of equal size:
Home country (H) and Foreign country (F). We ignore third-country eﬀects.
The two economies are totally symmetric. The structural model with then
reduce to a small forward-looking New Keynesian DSGE model, comprising a
dynamic IS equation for output and a “New Keynesian Phillips Curve” spec-
iﬁcation for inﬂation for each country. In addition to the channels for ﬁscal
policy transmission outlined above, we allow for habit formation in consump-
tion, which is necessary to capture the observed persistence in the output-gap
response to shocks.(see Leith and Malley, 2002). We model a hybrid Phillips
curve, allowing for partly backward-looking inﬂation expectations (see Galí,
Gertler and D. López-Salido, 2001, 2003).
3See Gali et al. (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002).
42.2.1 Consumers
We follow Gali et al. (2002) in assuming two types of households: those in
the ﬁrst group, denoted by i,b e n e ﬁt from full access to national and inter-
national capital markets and as such are free to optimize. The proportion of
optimising consumers in each country is given by (1 − ϑ).






























t represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be deﬁned
below), Ht is an index of external habits and No
t is the level of employment.
β ∈ (0,1) represents the subjective rate of time preference, σc the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion, σn the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply with
respect to real wage and εn
s is a shock to labour supply. Finally, Et denotes
the expectation operator conditional on the time t information set.
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Optimizing consumers maximize (1) subject to their intertemporal budget


















Their ﬁnancial wealth (at) is held in the form of one-period state-contingent
securities, which yield a return of rt. Home households can hold their wealth
in bonds issued in country H, BH,t, and bonds issued in country F, BF,
which oﬀer the same return (at = BH,t + BF,t). The optimizing consumer’s
disposable income is deﬁned as consisting of labour income wtNoi
t plus the
dividends from the proﬁts of the imperfectly competitive ﬁrms Di
t,m i n u s
personal taxes Ti
t, which are lump-sum by assumption.
The second group of households, a proportion ϑ of the total, follows a
rule of thumb behaviour: these households consume out of current disposable
5income, and supply a constant amount of labour4, NRT. This admittedly ad
hoc assumption may be justiﬁed assuming myopia or limited participation









t .( 4 )
The Home Country Household’s Optimisation Problem Rearrang-
ing the ﬁrst order conditions associated with (1) and aggregating across con-





















































































At a given time t each household is called to solve an intratemporal prob-
lem for the optimal choice of consumption bundles (deﬁned below) and diﬀer-
entiated consumption goods, indexed by z ∈ [0,1].W el e tg o o d sw h o s ei n d e x
4Galì et al. (2002) show that supplying a constant amount of labour is optimal when
personal taxes, Tt, levied on rule-of-thumb consumers are always nil. This result would
never obtain in our model, where taxes and transfers are explicitly modeled. Thus, for sake
of simplicity we assume a constant labour supply. Since consumption cannot be negative,






to be produced in country H whereas the remaining in country F.5
Preferences over consumption bundles are modelled according to a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) speciﬁcation with paramter 0.5 <χ<1





































Parameters η and θ, both assumed greated than one, respectively measure
the elasticity of substitution between consumption bundles CH,t and CF,t and
the elasticity of substitution among each of the diﬀerentiated goods either
being produced in country H or F.
Solving the cost minimization problem for the purchase of one unit of the
composite consumption Ct gives rise the Home household’s demand schedules












In the same vein, Home household’s demand schedules for good z produced












Two things are noteworthy. First, demand functions for consumption bundles
CH,t and CF,t are aﬀected by the home bias parameter χ:e v e ni nt h ei n s t a n c e
of pH,t = pF,t the ratio of H-produced goods to F-produced goods is higher in
the Home country. Second, in the case η = θ, demand functions for cH,t(z)












5In what follows subscript H or F denote the country where diﬀerentiated consumption
goods are produced.
7I nt h er e s to ft h ea n a l y s i sw ec o n t i n u et oa s s u m et h a tη = θ.





























































































Consumption-Based Price Indices The consumption price index which






































B e c a u s et h e r ea r en oi m p e d i m e n t st ot r a d ea n dt h et w oc o u n t r i e ss h a r et h e








Thus, it also follows that P∗
H,t = PH,t and P∗
F,t = PF,t. However, due to the
idiosyncratic taste introduced in the preferences over consumption bundles,





In each economy there is a continuum of ﬁrms, producing the varieties of
goods, and they act as monopolistic competitors. We assume a ﬁxed capi-
tal stock, and ﬁrms’ output of each good variety z follows a Cobb-Douglas




We introduce a channel for ﬁscal policy by assuming that taxes on labour
take the form of a uniform payroll tax6. Firms’ demand for labour in each
country for for each good variety is therefore deﬁned as:
pj,t (z)
©





= Wt j = F,H (13)
where tPR




Nt ,w h e r e
TPR
t are the total revenues from the payroll tax.
We turn next to ﬁrms’ pricing behavior. We consider a standard model
of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in Galí, Gertler
and López-Salido (2001), and Leith and Malley (2002)7.M o r e p r e c i s e l y ,
sticky prices are incorporated into this model by assuming a Calvo pricing
mechanism, whereby only a given proportion of ﬁrms, deﬁned as (1−ξ),c a n
adjust prices every period whereas the remainder supplies output on demand
at a constant price. A share γ of the adjusting ﬁr m si sa s s u m e dt oi n d e x
prices to inﬂation in the previous period8, while the remaininder, (1−γ),s e t
their prices optimally to maximize expected discounted real proﬁts9,w i t ha
discount factor β.
2.2.3 Fiscal Authority
In modelling the ﬁscal authorities’ behaviour in each country therer are two
possible alternatives. On the one hand, we can consider ﬁscal authorities
6This implies that the optimizing consumer’s choice between leisure and consumption
is not aﬀected.
7See also Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Sbordone (2002).
8This was pioneered by Galí and Gertler (1999). Similar backward-looking elements
can be introduced to the NKPC equation by introducing indexation of all non-re-optimised
prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, and Woodford, 2002, chapter 3).
9A similar speciﬁcation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be obtained by making
the indexation process part of the optimisation process (see Smets and Wouters, 2002).
9as having the same households’ preferences (with the bias parameter as
well). In this case, total demand for the generic good z stems from do-
mestic and foreign households’ consumption and from domestic and foreign










On the other hand, we can model domestic ﬁscal authority’s preferences as
deﬁned only on domestically-produced goods and similarly for the foreign







For sake of simplicity we shall model public expenditures according to
the latter speciﬁcation.
2.2.4 The Global Economy
The solution method ﬁrst requires to derive expressions for the world weighted
averages: XW
t = 1
2 [Xt + X∗
t ]. Country speciﬁcv a r i a b l ea r et h u sg i v e nb y :
Xt = XW
t + 1
2 [Xt − X∗
t ].
Let us deﬁne two others variables that we will be useful throughout the




















t = Ct + C
∗
t + Gt + G
∗
t
where according to our notation: Y W
t = 1
2 [Yt + Y ∗
t ], GW
t = 1
2 [Gt + G∗
t].
102.2.5 Log-linearization
Equation (10) and (11) become:
ˆ Pt = χ ˆ PH,t +( 1− χ) ˆ PF,t
ˆ P
∗
t =( 1− χ) ˆ P
∗
H,t + χ ˆ P
∗
F,t
where in what follows, hatted variables denote log-deviations from the steady
state and barred variables denote steady-state values.
The log-linearized real exchange rate and the terms of trade read as:
ˆ Qt = ˆ P
∗
t − ˆ Pt and ˆ St = ˆ PF,t − ˆ PH,t.
2.2.6 World demand schedules for Home and Foreign diﬀerenti-
ated good







































































Evaluating the above expression in steady state and normalising prices
to one (i.e. pH = P = P∗ =1 ) yields to:
Y = χ[C + G]+( 1− χ)[C
∗ + G
∗]
Loglinearisation of (14) around the deterministic zero inﬂation steady
state leads to:








































t − ˆ PH,t
´
can equivalently be rewrit-
t e ni nt e r m so fˆ St as:
ˆ Pt − ˆ PH,t =( 1− χ) ˆ St
ˆ P
∗
t − ˆ PH,t = χˆ St
Therefore:



























2.3 Deriving the IS and the Phillips Curves









































































































Note that if we imposed no habit, λ =0 , and had no RT consumers,
NRT
N = ϑ =0 , our speciﬁcation for the model would collapse to a purely
forward looking IS curve (see Carroll, 2000). Moreover, the presence of non-
optimizing consumers establishes a link between the demand for goods, net
personal taxes, b T,a n dt h er e a lw a g e .
After lengthy but straightforward manipulations we get the two IS equa-
tions
∆ˆ Yt+1 = κ1 (it − πt+1)+κ2∆ˆ St+1 − κ3∆ˆ St + k4∆ ˆ C
RT
t + κ5∆ ˆ Gt+1 + (17)
+k6∆ˆ Y
∗
t+1 − k7∆ ˆ G
∗
t+1 + κ8∆ˆ Yt +
−κ9∆ˆ Y
∗











− κ2∆ˆ St+1 + κ3∆ˆ St + k4∆ ˆ C
RT∗
t + κ5∆ ˆ G
∗
t+1 + (18)
+k6∆ˆ Yt+1 − k7∆ ˆ Gt+1 + κ8∆ˆ Y
∗
t +
−κ9∆ˆ Yt − κ10∆ ˆ G
∗

























































































b πt = χb πH,t +( 1− χ)b πF,t
b π∗
t =( 1− χ)b πF,t + χb πH,t
∆ˆ St = b πF,t − b πH,t
b πt, b π∗
t respectively deﬁne domestic and foreign consumer price inﬂation
rates in terms of the inﬂation rates of domestically and foreign produced
goods.
Fiscal policy directly impacts on output in this model through three chan-
nels. First, through the usual resource withdrawal eﬀect of government con-
sumption, b gt. Second, through the impact of net personal taxes b T on the
current disposable income of rule-of-thumb consumers. Third, through the
impact of payroll taxes TPR on the real wage of rule-of-thumb consumers10.
Finally, rule-of-thumb consumers weaken the impact of interest rate policy
on aggregate demand. As shown in Galì et al. (2002) this may have impor-
tant implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Indeed, our estimates
10From equations (4) and (13) it should be clear that, in each period, the equilibrium
real wage is inversely related to employment and the payroll tax. As we show in the
Appendix, it is the rate of change of these variables that aﬀects current output.
14conﬁrm that rule-of-thumb consumers weaken the output response to interest
rate changes.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tw h i l s tg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gi m p a c t so nt h e
consumption behaviour of optimising consumers via the resource-withdrawal
eﬀect, taxation impacts through its eﬀe c to nd i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ef o rr u l e -
of-thumb consumers, and hence via the external habit (total consumption)
variable. This ensures that government spending enters via a distributed
lag in (17, 18), while personal and payroll taxes enter in diﬀerences, with
coeﬃcients of diﬀerent size. As we shall see below, this drives some of the
results of the model.
2.3.2 The Phillips Curve
The log-linearization of the ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decision together with
the dynamic equation for the price index under the Calvo mechanism with
indexation, leads to a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC): (see Gali et
al., 2001, 2003, Muscatelli et al., 2003b) for details). For each country, the
Phillips curves are deﬁned for the bundle of domestically produced goods:
b πH,t =
γb πH,t−1 + βξEtb πH,t+1
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)




γb πF,t−1 + βξEtb πF,t+1
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)

























H,t − d nH,t
´
























F,t − d nF,t
´
+d nF,t− c yF,t (22)
15where b si,t is the percentage deviation from steady state of the labour cost
share11
It is important to note that in estimating the parameters of the Phillips
Curves, we do not explicitly model wage-setting behaviour, and the determi-
nation of employment is given by the static production function. Other recent
contributions (Leith and Malley, 2002, Smets and Wouters, 2002) estimate
wage equations, and adding a wage equation would have enabled us to con-
sider the possibility of sticky wage dynamics with some forward-lookingness
in wage-setting. However, this would have also added to the complexity of
the model. In simulating our model, as we shall see below, we introduce an
element of adjustment in nominal wages. This ampliﬁes the inertia generated




In order to simulate our model, we need to estimate or calibrate the param-
eter values. As we intend to employ a symmetric model of the EMU area,
the best approach is to estimate the values of the parameters using aggre-
gate Euro-area data, and by assumption use these parameters for our two
repersentative countries (H and F).
The data employed is the aggregated Euro-area data produced by the
European Central Bank (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2001). The time
series are quarterly over the sample period 1970(1)-1998(2). While we obtain
new estimates of the structural parameters present for the global IS curve,
for the NKPC we essentially use the estimates reported in Galí et al. (2001,
2003), as these were obtained using the same data set12.
To capture the spirit of the New Keynesian models as log-linearizations,
the data are transformed so that the variables are expressed in deviations
11Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) specify b si,t in terms of average real marginal




12The estimation was carried out using RATS, version 5.
16from the “steady state”13. Both real and nominal variables are de-trended
using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter set to 1600. Note
that as the inﬂation rate and interest rate always enter the model together,
all the equations are ’balanced’ in terms of the levels of integration of the
dependent and explanatory variables.14
3.2 Estimation Methods
The IS and NKPC curves is are non-linear in the structural parameters to be
estimated. We use the generalized methods of moments (GMM) framework
to estimate the model. Following Hansen (1982), the assumption of rational
expectations suggests some natural orthogonality restrictions that can be
employed as part of the estimation. Each equation estimated using GMM is
of the form:
yit = fi(θi,zit)+uit (23)
where for each equation i, yit is the vector of dependent variables, θi is
the (ai × 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and zit is the
(ki × 1) vector of explanatory variables. The GMM approach is based on
the fact that e θi, the true value of θi, has the property E[hi( e θi,wit)] = 0,
where wit ≡ ( y0
it,z0
it,x0
it),a n dxit is an (ri × 1) vector of instruments that
are correlated with zit. GMM then chooses the estimate θi so as to make
the sample moment as close as possible to the population moment of zero.
The validity of these instruments can be tested for each equation by using
Hansen’s J-test, which is distributed as a χ2(ri − ai) statistic under the null
of valid orthogonality conditions.
GMM or IV estimation has been used by a number of authors to estimate
New Keynesian models of this type15. One problem is that the estimated
IS and NKPC equations are highly nonlinear in parameters, and the rank
condition for identiﬁcation is not met unless a number of parameters in these
two equations are ﬁxed. To begin with, in estimating the output equation
13Which is commonplace in this literature (see Smets and Wouters, 2002, Leith and
Malley, 2002).
14T h eg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gd a t a( G) is total government spending excluding transfers
and interest payments, whilst we use employers’ social security contributions as payroll
taxes (TPR), and personal taxes as (T).
15For instance, Galì, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Leith and Malley (2002), Kara






























0.84 0.16 0.503 0.353 0.121 0.260 1.353
Table 1: Steady State Values
we impose that the steady-state ratios are given by their average values
computed over the sub-sample period 1990(1)-1998(2)16. These values are
reported in Table 1.
Furthermore, in order to increase the accuracy of the estimation we cali-
brate some structural parameters at values taken from other empirical studies
(see Muscatelli et al. 2003b). We impose the habit formation parameter on
aggregate consumption to be equal to unity (λ =1 ), the coeﬃcient of rel-
ative risk aversion (ρ) to be equal to 2, and the elasticity of demand for
consumption goods (θ) as equal to 4.
3.3 Calibrated and Estimated Parameters
Table 2 reports the estimated structural parameters of the Euro-area IS curve
obtained using GMM over the full sample period, and the Euro-area NKPC
parameters reported in Galí et al. (2001, 2003). Standard errors for all the
parameters estimates are reported in brackets. Our vector of instruments
xit include: a constant, output, government spending excluding government
transfers, direct tax per worker, the nominal exchange rate, wage rate, in-
ﬂation rate and the nominal interest rate. The overall ﬁt for the estimated
equation is good: the R2 statistic for the ﬁtted IS curve is 0.83. The Hansen
statistic for overidentifying restrictionts test is 59.39, which is distributed as
a χ2(41) under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The null hypothe-
sis of valid instruments is not rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Further
details on the estimation procedure are reported in Muscatelli et al. (2004).
Our point estimates thus suggest that about 50% of consumers are rule-
of-thumb consumers, whilst 65% of total consumption in steady state is given
by optimising consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers account for about 61%
16Our choice is motivated by the fact that observed sample ratios exhibit a trend until





















Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Table 2: Structural parameters estimates
of total employment. Point estimates of the Calvo parameter suggests that
about 84% of ﬁrms do not adjust their prices every period and of those who
adjust prices, about 30% simply index prices.
In addition to the estimated parameters we set χ the proportion of home-
produced goods in the consumption of each country equal to 0.7, which re-
ﬂects a bias towards home-produced goods in most large Euroland countries.
In order to close the model we need to dsecribe the behaviour of the mon-
etary and ﬁscal authorities. As noted above, we do not consider strategic
interactions between the ECB and the two countries’ ﬁscal authorities. In-
stead we examine teh interaction between a central bank which operates a
forward-looking inﬂation targeting framework, and ﬁscal authorities which
rely on ﬁscal rules based on automatic stabilisers.
In this model, monetary policy has a relatively weak eﬀect due to the rel-
atively large proportion of RT consumers, who only indirectly react to the in-
terest rate rule17. In addition, ﬁscal policy operates through a wider number
of channels: taxation eﬀects on consumption through liquidity constrained
consumers, taxation wedge eﬀects on inﬂation, and interaction eﬀects due to
the presence of RT consumers.
3.3.1 Monetary Rule
In contrast to the numerous papers on the behaviour of the Federal Reserve
and other central banks, the empirical literature on the behaviour of the
ECB is limited, mainly due to its short history. We assume that the ECB’s
monetary policy rule for the nominal interest rate b it follows a form similar
to the standard forward-looking Taylor rule speciﬁcation which has become
17A ss h o w ni nG a l ìet al. (2002), rule-of-thumb consumers are aﬀected by interest rate
changes only to the extent that the real wage adjusts following the new labour conditions
determined by the optimising consumers’ reaction to such interest rate changes
19commonplace in the literature18 (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998, 2000;
Muscatelli et al. 2002; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a,b):
b it = φ1Etb πt+q + φ2b yt+s + φ3b it−1 (24)
where we also allow for inertia in the rule, due to interest-rate smoothing if
φ3 6=0 .
As shown by Sauer and Sturm (2003) this forward-looking inertial Taylor
rule ﬁts the Euroland data reasonably well for teh post-EMU period. We use
their estimates of the φi parameters to simulate our model. This provides
us with a benchmark against which to assess the performance of diﬀerent
designs for automatic ﬁscal stabilizers in our structural model.
3.3.2 Fiscal Rules
Unlike Muscatelli et al. (2003a), we consider simple format for our ﬁscal
policy rules and let automatic stabilizers to depend on current real activity
condition and lagged debt accumulation (relative to output). Thus:
b gt = −δ1b yt − δ2(b bt−1 − b yt−1) (25)
b g
∗
t = −δ1b y
∗
t − δ2(b b
∗
t−1 − b y
∗
t−1) (26)
b τt = ϕ1b yt + ϕ2(b bt−1 − b yt−1) (27)
b τ
∗
t = ϕ1b y
∗
t + ϕ2(b b
∗
t−1 − b y
∗
t−1) (28)
where b τt is the vector of our two tax measures, personal taxes b tt and payroll
taxes, b tTR
t . Our taxation rule therefore imposes the same adjustment pattern
on both taxes, and does not look at how a mix of tax measures might improve
the design of policy19.T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eﬁscal policy mix is considered
18The main diﬀerence is that we use a contemporaneous value of the output gap (see
Muscatelli et al. 2002) as opposed to expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998, 2000). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford
(2002a,b). For an alternative approach to modeling interest rate responses, involving
nonlinearities in reaction functions, see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001).
19Andres and Domenech (2003) provide an analysis of how diﬀerent tax measures might
impact on output and inﬂation variability.
20further below. As discussed above, we have a limited feedback to the debt
accumulation, through a debt to GDP term which approximates to a response
to the debt to GDP ratio.
For our baseline case, we set δ1 = ϕ1 =0 .5 and δ2 = ϕ2 =0 .05.A
coeﬃcient of 0.5 on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in Van
Den Noord (2000) and adopted in studies on ﬁscal stabilization (e.g. West-
away, 2003). The coeﬃcient on debt ensures stability but ensures that this
d o e sn o ts w a m pt h ei m p a c to fﬁscal stabilisers given the conﬁguration of the
temporary shocks.
3.4 Dynamic Simulations
Having obtained the structural parameter estimates, we can perform dynamic
simulations of our two-country New Keynesian model20 and examine the
transmission mechanism of ﬁscal and monetary policies.
We focus on the dynamic model solution under rational expectations. To
illustrate the properties of the model, we shocking each structural equation
and policy equation in turn, and examine the impulse responses. As we do not
have an estimated wage equation, we assume a minimum amount of nominal
inertia in the model, by stipulating that nominal wages adjust gradually
towards the initial real wage equilibrium with an autoregressive parameter
of 0.5 per quarter. Employment is determined by the log-linearization of
the production technology (12).
(***insert ﬁgures 1 to 4 here ***)
4 Designing Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union
We now examine the extent to which national ﬁscal policies can assist with
macroeconomic adjustment in EMU. The key issues we consider are: do
automatic stabilisers actually assist the ECB’s function of stabilising output
and inﬂation in the union, and in the individual countries, i.e. do the ﬁscal
authorities assist or impede the eﬀorts of the ECB? Which ﬁscal instruments
20The model is solved using Winsolve version 3.0 (see Pierse, 2000), which provides
numerical solutions for linear and non-linear rational expectations models. We solve our
model using the Stacked Newton method in Winsolve. In solving the models with struc-
tural shocks (and further below with policy shocks) these are treated as unanticipated by
economic agents.
21are more eﬀective in stabilising the union and the individual economies? How
do the stabilisation properties of ﬁscal policy vary in response to symmetric
and asymmetric shocks?
4.1 What is the Value Added from Fiscal Stabilisers
in Individual Countries?
We now simulate the model in response to a temporary demand (IS) and
a temporary supply (NKPC) shock to one of the two countries (H). We
consider a shock of 1% in the ﬁrst period which then decays over time with
an autoregressive parameter of 0.5. The reason for not considering pure
asymmetric shocks (shocks of equal and opposite sign on each EMU country)
is that, given the identical structure of the two countries, and that the ECB is
assumed to target EMU average outcomes, monetary policy will not react to
such shocks initially. Following the asymmetric demand and supply shocks
considered here, the union’s inﬂation and output levels will change, thus
triggering a response from the ECB.
We do not conduct a formal welfare analysis of the policy regimes con-
sidered, as this is complicated by the presence of heterogeneous consumers
(optimisers and RT consumers)21. Instead our focus is on output and inﬂa-
tion variability, which allows us to gauge how ﬁscal policy design can impact
on output and inﬂation variability.
In the case of each shock, we consider the following four policy scenarios:
1 .w h e r et h eE C Bo p e r a t e si t sp o l i c yr u l e( 2 4 ) ,b u tw h e r eﬁscal policy is
kept exogenously ﬁxed, i.e. the automatic stabilizers (25) and (27) are
kept switched oﬀ;
2. where only the government spending rule is switched on (25) together
with the monetary policy rule;
3. where only the taxation rules are switched on (27) together with the
monetary policy rule;
4. where both ﬁscal rules are switched on, (25) and (27), together with
t h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l e.
21See for instance Benigno and Woodford (2003). We are currently considering the
extension of our modeling framework to include some welfare analysis.
22This will allow us to compute the value added in terms of the impact
on output and inﬂation variability. We report the results in Tables 3 and 4
for both asymmetric demand and supply shocks (modelled respectively as a
transitory shock to the IS curve in country H and the Phillips Curve in coun-
try H), and symmetric demand and supply shocks (transitory shocks to IS
curves in both countries and Phillips Curves in both countries respectively).
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are reported as the ratio of the variances of out-
put (for each country and for the output diﬀerential) and inﬂation (for both
product prices π and consumer prices πc) and in the scenarios 2-4 relative
to scenario 1. Thus, for instance G
M gives the relative variance of output and
inﬂation under policy scenario 2 relative to 1, and T+G
M reports the relative
variances for scenario 4 relative to 1. A value of the variance ratio in excess of
unity suggests that adding the ﬁscal instrument(s) is destabilising relative to
using ECB policy alone, and a value of the ratio less than unity suggest that
the ﬁscal policy instrument(s) in question reduce the variability of output or
inﬂation. In the case of the symmetric shocks the variability of output and
inﬂation is obviously identical across countries because of the symmetry of
the model.
Turning ﬁrst to Table 3, we immediately see that both ﬁscal instruments
stabilise output and their role is enanched when activeted simultaneously.
The latter result is particularly true in the case of asymmetric demand shock
where the variability of domestic output is reduced by approximately 80%.
To a much lesser extent this conclusion also holds for asymmertic supply
shocks.
Turning next to Table 4, the results for symmetric shocks also suggest a
complementarity between the two ﬁscal policy instruments. This is in sharp
contrast with the "Brussels consensus" based on the view that the ECB alone
should stabilize the union-wide economy (Buti et al., 2001).22
22Following Van Den Noord (2000), Westaway (2003) and Andres and Domenech (2003),
in our simulation exercises we also experimented backward-looking speciﬁcation, where ﬁs-
cal instruments depend on yt−1. Our results are reboust to this modiﬁcation. However,
some important diﬀerences arise when the ﬁscal rules include an autoregressive term with
coeﬃcient 0.5. In this case the stebilising properties of automatic stabilisers are signiﬁ-
cantly weakened.













Var(Y )0 .216 0.960 0.885 0.834 0.955 0.868
Var(Y ∗)0 .191 0.913 0.768 0.809 0.942 0.845
Var(Y − Y ∗)0 .211 0.951 0.863 0.824 0.949 0.858
Var(π)0 .204 0.922 0.889 0.982 0.992 1.001
Var(π∗)0 .181 0.853 0.426 1.150 1.217 0.970
Var(πc)0 .214 0.949 0.659 0.995 0.992 1.001
Var(πc∗)0 .141 0.728 0.187 1.009 1.014 0.998
Table 3: Relative Variances to asymmetric shocks













Var(Y )= Var(Y ∗)0 .894 0.973 0.920 0.894 0.984 0.922
Var(π)= Var(π∗)1 .005 1.058 0.964 0.999 0.999 1.000
Var(πc)= Var(πc∗)1 .005 1.058 0.964 0.999 0.999 1.000
T a b l e4 :R e l a t i v eV a r i a n c e st os y m m e t r i cs h o c k s
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has used a two-country New Keynesian DGE model to examine
the extent to which national ﬁscal policies can assist macroeconomic adjust-
ment within EMU, in response to a variety of shocks. We use a model which
embodies liquidity constrained (rule-of-thumb) consumers and home bias in
consumption, and use some recent estimates of the structural model on Euro
area data to calibrate our model.
The key conclusion which emerges from our analysis is that automatic
stabilizers based on both government spending and taxation policy seem to
combine eﬃciently with forward-looking (inertial) Taylor rules on the part of
the ECB in the case of symmetric shocks. In contrast with the popular view
that takes for granted the eﬀectiveness of automatic stabilisers in the face of
asymmetric shocks we ﬁnd that national stabilisers play a role only if private
24consumption and/or government spending exhibit a signiﬁcant home bias.
Further research should consider the possibility that progressive income
tax rates could help to stabilise inﬂation through the well-known ﬁscal drag
mechanism.
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Figure 4. Impulse response functions to a 1% monetary policy shock.
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